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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 11:56 pm
Time: 11:56 pm
Results for passenger screening
7 results foundAuthor: Countermeasures Assessment and Security Experts Title: Public Transportation Passenger Security Inspections: A Guide for Policy Decision Makers Summary: Worldwide terrorist activities create many security-related concerns for government leaders, security agencies, and transit agency managers. In response to these concerns, many transit agencies are assessing and introducing activities to reduce the risk of attacks on their systems. Most public transportation agencies have instituted security measures and continue to re-assess their situation as new threats are identified. One measure receiving more consideration is the introduction of passenger security inspections. However, there are many policy and logistical issues associated with implementing these inspections. Public transportation agencies could benefit from assistance in defining their options for conducting passenger security inspections. Apart from determining whether security inspections are feasible for one's agency, there is also a need to determine appropriate methodologies for implementing such measures. The objective of this guide is to provide guidance that a public transportation agency may use when considering whether, where, when, and how to introduce a passenger security inspection program into its operations. Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2007. 180p. Source: Internet Resource; TCRP Report 86; Public Transportation Security, Volume 13 Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119336 Keywords: Passenger ScreeningTerrorismTransit CrimeTransportation Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA's Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges Summary: "To enhance avaiation security, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began initial testing in October 2003 of its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program. Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) carry out SPOT’s mission to identify persons who pose a risk to aviation security by focusing on behavioral and appearance indicators. GAO was asked to review the SPOT program. GAO analyzed (1) the extent to which TSA validated the SPOT program before deployment, (2) implementation challenges, and (3) the extent to which TSA measures SPOT’s effect on aviation security. GAO analyzed TSA documents, such as strategic plans and operating procedures; interviewed agency personnel and subject matter experts; and visited 15 SPOT airports, among other things. Although the results from these visits are not generalizable, they provided insights into SPOT operations. GAO recommends that TSA, among other things, use an independent panel of experts to assist in validating SPOT, enhance SPOT data collection and analysis, fully utilize TSA resources to identify possible threats, and establish a plan to develop more outcome-oriented measures for SPOT. DHS reviewed a draft of this report and generally concurred with our recommendations although its plans do not fully address one of our recommendations." Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2010. 89p. Source: Internet Resource; GAO-10-763; Accessed August 16, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10763.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10763.pdf Shelf Number: 119615 Keywords: Airport SecurityPassenger ScreeningTransportation Security |
Author: BearingPoint Title: Private Screening Operations Performance Evaluation Report Summary: This report presents an evaluation of the performance of private security screening operations at U.S. airports for the Transportation Security Administration. The evaluation sought to determine whether performance of private screening operations was equal to or greater than that provided by the federal government. An impartial process was developed for analyzing performance and reviewed the five commercial airports that retained private screening personnel after federalization of the nation's security screeing workforce in 2002. The evaluation determined that private screened airports performed at the same or a better level than federally screened operations. Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2010 at: http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/Summary_Report.pdf Year: 2004 Country: United States URL: http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/Summary_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 119854 Keywords: Airports, SecurityHomeland SecurityPassenger ScreeningPrivate Security |
Author: Lord, Stephen M. Title: Aviation Security: TSA Is Taking Steps to Validate the Science Underlying Its Passenger Behavior Detection Program, but Efforts May Not Be Comprehensive Summary: The attempted passenger aircraft bombing of Northwest flight 253 on December 25, 2009, provided a vivid reminder that the civil aviation system remains an attractive terrorist target. To enhance aviation security, in October 2003 the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began testing of its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security. The SPOT program utilizes behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers. This testimony provides information on (1) the extent to which TSA has validated the scientific basis for SPOT and (2) other operational challenges. This statement is based on a prior report GAO issued in May 2010 on SPOT, including selected updates made in March 2011. For the updates, GAO reviewed documentation on TSA’s progress in implementing the report’s recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-461T: Accessed April 18, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11461t.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11461t.pdf Shelf Number: 121378 Keywords: Airport SecurityPassenger ScreeningTransporation Security |
Author: Lord, Stephen M. Title: Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress, but Additional Efforts Are Needed to Improve Security Summary: The attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 in December 2009 underscores the need for effective aviation security programs. Aviation security remains a daunting challenge with hundreds of airports and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of checked baggage. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has spent billions of dollars and implemented a wide range of aviation security initiatives. Two key layers of aviation security are (1) TSA's Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program designed to identify persons who may pose a security risk; and (2) airport perimeter and access controls security. This testimony provides information on the extent to which TSA has taken actions to validate the scientific basis of SPOT and strengthen airport perimeter security. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from September 2009 through September 2011 and selected updates in August and September 2011. To conduct the updates, GAO analyzed documents on TSA's progress in strengthening aviation security, among other things. DHS completed an initial study in April 2011 to validate the scientific basis of the SPOT program; however, additional work remains to fully validate the program. In May 2010, GAO reported that TSA deployed this program, which uses behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers, before determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system. TSA officials said that SPOT was deployed in response to potential threats, such as suicide bombers, and was based on scientific research available at the time. TSA is pilot testing revised program procedures at Boston-Logan airport in which behavior detection officers will engage passengers entering screening in casual conversation to help determine suspicious behaviors. TSA plans to expand this pilot program in the fall of 2011. GAO recommended in May 2010 that DHS, as part of its validation study, assess the methodology to help ensure the validity of the SPOT program. DHS concurred and stated that the study included an independent review with a broad range of agencies and experts. The study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees. However, DHS's study was not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. The study also noted that additional work was needed to comprehensively validate the program. TSA officials are assessing the actions needed to address the study's recommendations but do not have time frames for completing this work. In September 2009 GAO reported that since 2004 TSA has taken actions to strengthen airport perimeter and access controls security by, among other things, deploying a random worker screening program; however, TSA had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment or developed a national strategy. Specifically, TSA had not conducted vulnerability assessments for 87 percent of the approximately 450 U.S. airports regulated for security by TSA in 2009. GAO recommended that TSA develop (1) a comprehensive risk assessment and evaluate the need to conduct airport vulnerability assessments nationwide and (2) a national strategy to guide efforts to strengthen airport security. DHS concurred and TSA stated that the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment, issued in July 2010, was to provide a comprehensive risk assessment of airport security. However, this assessment did not consider the potential vulnerabilities of airports to an insider attack--an attack from an airport worker with authorized access to secure areas. In August 2011, TSA reported that transportation security inspectors conduct vulnerability assessments annually at all commercial airports, including an evaluation of perimeter security. GAO has not yet assessed the extent to which inspectors consistently conduct vulnerability assessments. TSA also updated the Transportation Systems-Sector Specific Plan, which summarizes airport security program activities. However, the extent to which these activities were guided by measurable goals and priorities, among other things, was not clear. Providing such additional information would better address GAO's recommendation. GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen TSA's SPOT program and airport perimeter and access control security efforts. DHS and TSA generally concurred with the recommendations and have actions under way to address them. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-938T: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11938t.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11938t.pdf Shelf Number: 122775 Keywords: Airport SecurityPassenger ScreeningTransportation Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: TSA Explosives Detection Canine Program: Actions Needed to Analyze Data and Ensure Canine Teams Are Effectively Utilized Summary: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the federal agency that administers the National Canine Program (NCP), is collecting and using key data on its canine program, but could better analyze these data to identify program trends. TSA collects canine team data using the Canine Website System (CWS), a central management database. TSA uses CWS to capture the amount of time canine teams conduct training as well as searching for explosives odor, among other functions. However, TSA has not fully analyzed the data it collects in CWS to identify program trends and areas that are working well or in need of corrective action. Such analyses could help TSA to determine canine teams’ proficiency, inform future deployment efforts, and help ensure that taxpayer funds are used effectively. For example: • GAO analysis of canine team training data from May 2011 through April 2012 showed that some canine teams were repeatedly not in compliance with TSA’s monthly training requirement, which is in place to ensure canine teams remain proficient in explosives detection. • GAO analysis of TSA’s cargo-screening data from September 2011 through July 2012 showed that canine teams primarily responsible for screening air cargo placed on passenger aircraft exceeded their monthly screening requirement. This suggests that TSA could increase the percentage of air cargo it requires air cargo canine teams to screen or redeploy teams. TSA has not deployed passenger screening canines (PSC)—trained to identify and track explosives odor on a person—consistent with its risk-based approach, and did not determine PSC teams’ effectiveness prior to deployment. TSA’s 2012 Strategic Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; however, GAO found that PSC teams have not been deployed to the highest-risk airport locations. TSA officials stated that the agency generally defers to airport officials on whether PSC teams will be deployed, and some airport operators have decided against the use of PSC teams at their airports because of concerns related to the composition and capabilities of PSC teams. As a result of these concerns, the PSC teams deployed to higher-risk airport locations are not being used for passenger screening as intended, but for other purposes, such as screening air cargo or training. TSA is coordinating with aviation stakeholders to resolve concerns related to PSC team deployment, but has been unable to resolve these concerns, as of September 2012. Furthermore, TSA began deploying PSC teams in April 2011 prior to determining the teams’ operational effectiveness and before identifying where within the airport these teams would be most effectively utilized. TSA is in the process of assessing the effectiveness of PSC teams in the operational environment, but testing is not comprehensive since it does not include all areas at the airport or compare PSCs with already deployed conventional canines (trained to detect explosives in stationary objects). As a result, more comprehensive testing could provide TSA with greater assurance that PSC teams are effective in identifying explosives odor on passengers and provide an enhanced security benefit. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-239: Accessed March 25, 2013 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651725.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651725.pdf Shelf Number: 128126 Keywords: Canine UnitsPassenger ScreeningPolice Dogs (U.S.)Transportation Security |
Author: American Civil Liberties Union Title: Bad Trip: Debunking the TSA's 'Behavior Detection' Program Summary: Documents obtained by the ACLU through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit concerning the TSA's behavior detection program reinforce that the program utilizes unscientific techniques and creates an unacceptable risk of racial and religious profiling. Independent experts and government auditors have long criticized the behavior detection program as flawed and wasteful-the program cost at least $1.5 billion through 2015. The TSA's own documents and materials in its files now vindicate those criticisms. The documents show the evolution of the behavior detection program and make clear the extent to which it is a program of surveillance of unsuspecting travelers based on unreliable indicators. "Behavior detection officers," some of them dressed in plain clothes, scrutinize travelers at airports for over 90 behaviors that the TSA associates with stress, fear, or deception, looking for what the TSA calls signs of "mal-intent." The reliability of these so-called indicators is not supported by the scientific studies in the TSA files. The behavior detection officers may then engage travelers in "casual conversation" that is actually an effort to probe the basis for any purported signs of deception. When the officers think they perceive those behaviors, they follow the travelers, subject them to additional screening, and at times bring in law enforcement officers who can investigate them further. The TSA has repeatedly claimed that the behavior detection program is grounded in valid science, but the records that the ACLU obtained show that the TSA has in its possession a significant body of research that contradicts those claims. The records include numerous academic studies and articles that directly undermine the premise of the program: the notion that TSA officers can identify threats to aviation security with some reliability based on specific behaviors in an airport setting. In fact, the scientific literature in the TSA's own files reinforces that deception detection is inherently unreliable, and that many of the behaviors the TSA is apparently relying on are actually useless in detecting deception. The documents further show that the TSA either overstated the scientific validity of behavior detection techniques in communications with members of Congress and government auditors, or did not disclose information that discredited the program's scientific validity. The documents also include materials that range from culturally insensitive to racially and religiously biased and sexist. We do not know whether and to what extent the TSA relied on some of these materials in implementing its behavior detection program, but the materials do not provide credible support for its validity. Finally, previously undisclosed internal investigative materials shed more light on, and substantiate already public allegations of, racial and religious profiling by behavior detection officers at specific airports-Newark, Miami, Chicago, and Honolulu. The TSA should-indeed, must-screen passengers for weapons or other items that could threaten aviation security, but documents in its own files make clear that its behavior detection program does not further that mission. Congress should discontinue funding the TSA's behavior detection program, and the TSA should implement a rigorous anti-discrimination training program for its workforce. Details: New York: ACLU, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 14, 2018 at: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/dem17-tsa_detection_report-v02.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/dem17-tsa_detection_report-v02.pdf Shelf Number: 150182 Keywords: Airline PassengersAirport SecurityHomeland SecurityPassenger ScreeningRacial Profiling |